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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO
LIFE
Clare Holtzman*
On August 26, 2020, the only Native American on federal death row,
Lezmond Mitchell was executed by the federal government for the murder of
two Navajo citizens on Navajo Nation land. Federal law typically gives
Tribal Nations the right to determine whether the death penalty is used
against their citizens for crimes committed between Tribal citizens on Tribal
land. Yet here, the federal government utilized a loophole to seek the death
penalty against the Navajo Nation’s wishes. Lezmond Mitchell was not a
sympathetic man by any means; indeed, he brutally killed a grandmother
and her young granddaughter to steal their car as a part of a larger robbery
scheme. Under other circumstances, his execution may have been less
controversial, yet his case exemplifies the long colonial legacy of federal
overinvolvement in Tribal Nation affairs.
This paper examines the colonial legacy of federal overinvolvement in
Tribal Nation criminal justice affairs and exemplifies how that history still
manifests in the present through Lezmond Mitchell’s case. Further, this
paper explores two questions: first, whether the Constitution truly empowers
the federal government to intervene in criminal law matters that involve only
Tribal citizens and occur entirely on Tribal land; and second, whether such
involvement in Lezmond Mitchell’s case, as well as more broadly, is
consistent with the United States’ obligations under international law,
namely the self-determination and cultural rights of Tribal Nations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations
Charter.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 26, 2020, the only Native American on federal death row,
Lezmond Mitchell, was executed by the federal government for the murder
of two Navajo citizens on Navajo Nation land.1 The Major Crimes Act
(MCA) gives the federal government jurisdiction over enumerated crimes
committed between Tribal citizens on Tribal land.2 Under the Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA),3 Tribal Nations may opt into the federal
government’s implementation of the death penalty against their citizens for
crimes enumerated in the MCA.4 The Navajo Nation has a policy against the
death penalty and has not opted into the death penalty provision.5 However,
in this case, “[t]he United States circumvented the tribal option by also
charging Mitchell with carjacking resulting in death and seeking the death
penalty for that charge.”6 Carjacking resulting in death does not fall within
the MCA, but is rather a federal law of general applicability, the

1. Hailey Fuchs, Justice Dept. Executes Native American Man Convicted of Murder, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 26, 2020), https:// www.nytimes.com/ 2020/ 08/ 26/ us/ politics/ lezmond-mitchell-executed.html;
United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 942–44 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
3. Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3599.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3598.
5. Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Tamera Begay, The U.S. Shouldn’t Get to Decide if a Navajo Man
Dies, ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2020), https:// www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ archive/ 2020/08/us-shouldnt-getdecide-if-lezmond-mitchell-dies/615367/.
6. United States v. Mitchell, 958 F.3d 775, 793 (9th Cir. 2020) (Christen, J., concurring).
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jurisdictional basis of which comes from the Indian Commerce Clause in the
U.S. Constitution.7
While Lezmond Mitchell’s execution may have been less controversial
under other circumstances, given the severity of his crimes, the federal
government’s utilization of a loophole to pursue the death penalty stands as
a prime example of the long colonial legacy of the federal government’s
overinvolvement in Tribal Nation affairs. Indeed, whether the Indian
Commerce Clause provides the federal government with sufficient
justification for its involvement in intra-Tribal affairs at all is debated.8 In
addition to the domestic questions posed by the federal government’s
overinvolvement in Tribal Nation affairs and the execution of Lezmond
Mitchell, it also raises questions under international law.
As this paper will argue, international law provides Tribal Nations with
substantive and procedural rights, including: the recognition and
maintenance of their own legal systems; the recognition of their cultural
beliefs and languages in judicial processes; self-governance;9 the right to
participate in the central government; and the protection of their religious
beliefs.10 Therefore, international law recognizes the right of the Navajo
Nation to control its intra-Tribal affairs. When a people has been subject to
colonialism, this right to self-determination is more expansive and includes
rights of external self-determination, including the right to secede.11 While
historically there has been resistance to recognizing Indigenous Peoples as
colonized under international law, there has been advocacy to recognize
7. United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 946–48 (9th Cir. 2007); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
(“To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”).
8. See generally Warren Stapleton, Indian Country, Federal Justice: Is the Exercise of Federal
Jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act Constitutional?, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 338 (1997) (arguing that
the Indian Commerce Clause is not a sufficient basis upon which to render the Major Crimes Act
constitutional). Note that the constitutionality of the carjacking statute under the Commerce Clause is
itself debated, without even considering its use to circumvent Tribal sovereignty. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Crim. Res. Manual § 1112 (2020), https:// www.justice.gov/ archives/ jm/ criminal-resource-manual-11
12-constitutionality-carjacking-statute.
9. See infra Parts IV.B, V.
10. Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands
Question, 3 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., SPEC. SUPP. 3, 6 (1920) [hereinafter Report of the International
Committee on Aaland Islands] (“This principle . . . must . . . assure to some national Group the
maintenance and free development of its social, ethnical or religious characteristics.”); The Aaland
Islands Question, 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 691, 699 (1921) (“The new guarantees to be inserted in the
autonomy law should [include] . . . the maintenance of the landed property in the hands of the
Islanders . . . and . . . ensuring the appointment of a governor who will possess the confidence of the
population.”).
11. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R 217, 284–85 (Can.) (noting the right of
colonial peoples to secede).
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Indigenous Peoples within the United States as colonized peoples entitled to
external self-determination.12 Regardless of whether the Navajo Nation’s
right to self-determination is interpreted as only internal or external,
however, the Navajo Nation had the right under international law to
determine whether Lezmond Mitchell would receive the death penalty.13 By
disregarding the Navajo Nation’s decision on the matter, the United States
violated the Navajo Nation’s right to self-determination.14
In addition to violations of the Navajo Nation’s collective rights,
Lezmond Mitchell’s individual human rights were violated through the
prosecutor’s use of racially violent language that went uncorrected by the
U.S. justice system.15 While this paper primarily focuses on the violations of
the Navajo Nation’s rights, it is important to recognize the violations of the
individual—Lezmond Mitchell—that cannot be undone. The United States
violated Lezmond Mitchell’s right to life, his right to adequate
representation, his right to be free from cruel, infamous, or unusual
punishment, and his right to equality before the law.16 Although this paper
focuses on the violations of the collective, the Navajo Nation, those
violations occurred through the violations of Lezmond Mitchell’s rights.
Thus far, literature on the overinvolvement of the federal government
in Tribal Nation criminal justice affairs has primarily focused on the validity
of the United States’ exercise of criminal jurisdiction over Native America
through the lens of domestic law and theory.17 This paper will illustrate how
Lezmond Mitchell’s case serves as a prime example of the federal
overinvolvement presented in the literature and argue that in addition to
presenting domestic questions, such overinvolvement also violates
international law. This paper proceeds in five parts. Part II provides an
12. See infra Parts IV.B, V.
13. See infra Parts IV.B, V.
14. See infra Parts IV.B, V.
15. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(a),
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660-14 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD] (“The right to equal
treatment before the tribunals and other organs administering justice.”); United States v. Mitchell, 502
F.3d 931, 995–96 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the prosecutor’s references to lynching were not
prejudicial).
16. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. [IACHR], Mitchell v. United States, ¶¶ 10, 120, 135, Report No.
211/20, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 225 (Aug. 24, 2020) [hereinafter IACHR, Mitchell]; see also ICERD, supra
note 15.
17. See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 8 (arguing that the Major Crimes Act is unconstitutional); Nathan
Speed, Examining the Interstate Commerce Clause Through the Lens of the Indian Commerce Clause,
87 B.U. L. REV. 467 (2007) (concluding that both the Indian Commerce Clause and Interstate Commerce
Clause should be read narrowly); Kevin Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination,
84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 784 (2006) (discussing “[t]he omission of felony criminal justice from federal
initiatives favoring tribal self-determination”).
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overview of the domestic law history of federal overinvolvement in the
criminal law of tribal nations; Part III outlines the facts of Lezmond
Mitchell’s case and illustrates how his execution cannot be supported by the
U.S. Constitution; Part IV explains the international law relevant to his case;
and Part V examines how the federal government’s overinvolvement in
Tribal Nation criminal justice affairs generally, and in Lezmond Mitchell’s
case specifically, violate international law. And finally, Part VI concludes.
II. FEDERAL OVERINVOLVEMENT IN INTRA-TRIBAL CRIMINAL
LAW: 1817–200418
As the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Wheeler, Tribal
sovereignty in general, and over internal matters specifically, predates the
United States.19 Criminal law and the administration of criminal processes
existed on Tribal lands long before the imposition of American criminal
processes by the United States.20 Early criminal law relations between the
United States and Tribal Nations involved treaties, which provided for the
punishment of those who committed crimes against the other.21 But internal
affairs were the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Nations as “[f]ollowing
Britain’s tradition of noninterference with internal tribal affairs, early federal
officials respected virtually exclusive tribal control over Indian lands.”22
Then in 1817, Congress made its first incursion into criminal jurisdiction on
Tribal lands through the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1817.23 This act
allowed the United States to prosecute crimes committed by Indigenous
individuals, even when those crimes occurred on Tribal lands.24 However,
the United States still did not assert jurisdiction over crimes that occurred
between Tribal citizens on Tribal lands.25

18. For a more thorough discussion of the history of criminal law and Federal Indian Law in the
United States, see generally Washburn, supra note 17.
19. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978).
20. KEITH RICHOTTE, JR., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION 15–16 (2020)
(noting that arguments for colonialism often included the erroneous assertion that Indigenous Peoples
lacked legal frameworks and political governance).
21. See Washburn, supra note 17, at 792 (“[T]he tribes and the United States acknowledged the
power of Indian tribes to punish non-Indian offenders who intruded on Indian lands, and tribes agreed to
surrender to the United States for punishment any Indians who committed serious crimes against nonIndians.”).
22. Id. at 791.
23. Id. at 793 (citing the Trade and Intercourse Act §§ 1–2, 3 Stat. 383, 383 (1817)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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As the United States stole more and more Indigenous land,26 and
encroached further into Tribal territory, attitudes towards Tribal sovereignty
shifted.27 In 1871, Congress published a rider stating that “hereafter no
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with
whom the United States may contract by treaty.”28 While the United States
continued to create “agreements” with Tribal Nations that had similar power
to treaties,29 the “rider marked a significant shift in how the federal
government decided to approach Indian affairs” and “was a major blow to
tribal sovereignty.”30
This policy change towards Native Americans is seen perhaps most
starkly in the attempts by the United States to gain criminal jurisdiction over
Tribal Nations in the 1880s.31 Officials from the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) “had been attempting to acquire [criminal jurisdiction] since at least
1874, because they needed the coercive power of the criminal law as one
means to force the assimilation of the Indians.”32 Thus, “[t]he BIA decided
to initiate a test case” and found one in Ex parte Crow Dog.33 Crow Dog, a
Brule Lakota citizen, murdered another Brule Lakota citizen, Spotted Tail,
in 1881, for various reasons including perhaps “the federal government’s
interference in tribal politics.”34 In response to the murder, the Brule Lakota
26. See generally Matthew Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American
Lands, Resources, and People, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 381 (1998) (“It is not wrong for Native
Americans to raise criticism of American’s heritage of land theft because America is still committing that
crime.”).
27. Washburn, supra note 17, at 794–97 (outlining the shift in U.S. policy as well as the beginning
of the use of U.S. law enforcement on tribal lands). Washburn also discusses how U.S. law enforcement
became more involved with Tribal Nations in part because of the need to prevent violence between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals. Id. at 796; see generally RICHOTTE, supra note 20
(discussing the background and development of federal laws as related to Tribal Nations).
28. Future Treaties with Indian Tribes, Pub. L. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3641 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (2018)).
29. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 204 (1975) (holding that agreements concluded since the
end of treaty making had the same effect as treaties).
30. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 117–19.
31. Id. at 122.
32. See id. (quoting SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY,
TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 102 (1994)). See generally id.
for a discussion of the United States’ “pendulum” moving between assimilationist and separatist policies.
33. Id. at 122; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
34. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 122. Crow Dog’s motive for murdering Spotted Tail is contested
and while a number of accounts have been given, there are “few with citation to any original sources.”
Washburn, supra note 17, at 800 n.111. One account portrays Crow Dog as having made a “deliberate
effort to portray himself as the champion of traditional Brules against the arbitrary power of Spotted Tail,
an ‘agency chief’ installed by the U.S. Army.” HARRING, supra note 32, at 108–09. Sidney L. Harring
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engaged in a criminal justice procedure that involved “the council, the
peacemakers, and negotiation.”35 Crow Dog was not sentenced to spend any
time in confinement, which would have been the likely sentence according
to a Western criminal tradition, but instead his family agreed to pay Spotted
Tail’s family “$600, eight horses, and a blanket.”36
Although the Brule Lakota had already concluded their own criminal
justice procedures, the federal government nonetheless arrested Crow Dog,
convicted him of murder, and sentenced him to death.37 However, the
Supreme Court found that the federal government did not have criminal
jurisdiction over Crow Dog, recognizing the Brule Lakota’s power of “selfgovernment, the regulation by themselves of their own domestic affairs,
[and] the maintenance of order and peace among their own members by the
administration of their own laws and customs.”38 The Court also recognized
as troubling, and as an infringement, that the federal government sought to
impose its own criminal laws on Tribal Nations.39 While the Supreme Court
found for Crow Dog40 and the Brule Lakota, the case was utilized as a
justification for providing the federal government criminal jurisdiction over
crimes committed between Tribal citizens on Tribal lands.41 Calling upon
racist claims that Tribal Nations lacked a legal system and, thus, that
incursions were justified,42 the Secretary of the Interior argued that Congress
had to rectify what it saw as a mistake in Ex parte Crow Dog.43 Therefore,
in 1885 Congress enacted the MCA, giving the federal government
jurisdiction over enumerated crimes committed between Indigenous
notes in his book that this account is “an example of traditional tribal histories, which rely primarily on
white sources to create an ‘Indian history.’” Id. at 108 n.27 (citing GEORGE E. HYDE, SPOTTED TAIL’S
FOLK: A HISTORY OF THE BRULE SIOUX 308–36 (1961)). For a detailed description of Crow Dog’s case
see HARRING, supra note 32, at 100–41.
35. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 122.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 568.
39. Id. at 571 (“It is a case where, against an express exception in the law itself, that law, by
argument and inference only, is sought to be extended [over Indigenous Peoples] . . . separated by race,
by tradition . . . from the authority and power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an
external and unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil conduct, according to rules
and penalties of which they could have no previous warning; which judges them by a standard made by
others, and not for them, which takes no account of the conditions which should except them from its
exactions, and makes no allowance for their inability to understand it.”).
40. See RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 129 (“Crow Dog was not hanged and continued to exercise
great influence on the reservation for the rest of his lengthy life.”).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Washburn, supra note 17, at 803.
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individuals on Tribal lands.44
In 1886, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the MCA in United
States v. Kagama.45 In this case, the Supreme Court maintained that the
Indian Commerce Clause did not provide a constitutional basis for the
MCA.46 Instead, the Supreme Court upheld the MCA based upon “the federal
government’s geographic dominion over the United States and the federal
responsibility in light of the dependent status of tribes.”47 Statutes in the
United States require that Congress have some sort of Constitutional
authority to enact them.48 Yet, when the Supreme Court “first enunciated the
plenary power doctrine” in Kagama, it could not find a constitutional basis
for the power it held Congress to possess.49 Instead, the Court relied on
arguments external to the Constitution.50 Notably, the Supreme Court has
since utilized the Indian Commerce Clause to support plenary power, in spite
of the Kagama Court’s rejection of that argument, including in the 2004
United States v. Lara decision.51 As will be discussed infra, the court in
Lezmond Mitchell’s case also found the Indian Commerce Clause provided
jurisdiction over his case.52
In the present day, the United States has for the most part moved in a
direction of supporting Tribal self-determination and governance, with the
notable exception of criminal law.53 Current practice is generally
characterized by “a number of efforts by Congress to provide opportunities
for Tribal governments and peoples to exercise greater control over their own
lives, lands, families and other resources.”54 For instance, Tribal Nations can
set their own water quality standards and determine how to allocate social
service resources.55 But felony criminal law has been left out of these
Congressional initiatives.56 In fact, Congress has repeatedly expanded
federal powers over criminal law through the MCA and other legislation.57
44. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153).
45. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Washburn, supra note 17, at 806.
46. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378–79; Washburn, supra note 17, at 806–07.
47. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378–79; Washburn, supra note 17, at 806–07.
48. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 139.
49. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1015 (2015).
See also RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 139.
50. See RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 139.
51. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
52. See infra Part III.A.
53. Washburn, supra note 17, at 820, 822.
54. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 193.
55. Washburn, supra note 17, at 833.
56. Id. at 784.
57. Id.
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In 1968, Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), which
“limited tribal criminal justice authority” by capping the sentences Tribal
courts could impose to “six months of imprisonment and a $500 fine.”58
While a later amendment raised the limits to one year and a $5,000 fine, it
remains a significant restriction on Tribal sovereignty.59 In addition,
Congress has expanded federal control over criminal law on Tribal lands
through various amendments to the MCA, including, for example, the
addition of “statutory rape and assault with intent to commit rape” to the list
of enumerated crimes falling within its scope.60
Parallel to the expansion of federal powers, the courts have also reduced
the powers of Tribal Nations over criminal law within their territory. In 1978,
the same year the Supreme Court recognized that the sovereignty of Tribal
Nations gives them the “inherent authority to criminally prosecute their own
citizens[,]” it also ruled in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe that Tribal
Nations have no authority to prosecute anyone who is not Native American.61
Thus, according to the Supreme Court’s ruling, Tribal Nations could no
longer hold non-Native American individuals accountable for crimes
committed on Tribal Nation land.62 As a result, the issues Tribal Nations
already faced with non-Native American offenders were exacerbated as nonNative American individuals recognized “that reservations could be spaces
without formal consequences for their actions.”63 This was especially the
case given the failure of the federal government to consistently prosecute
non-Native
American
offenders,
with
consequences
falling
64
disproportionately on Native American women.
In response to advocacy around the victimization of Native American
women, Congress reauthorized the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
in 2013.65 This reauthorization permitted Tribal Nations to prosecute nonNative American individuals for “domestic and dating violence and
violations of protection orders.”66 However, the reauthorization also “creates
more federal oversight for tribal nations” and still does not permit Tribal
governments to prosecute other crimes committed by non-Native American

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 822; Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304.
RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 244.
Washburn, supra note 17, at 823–24.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 375.
RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 383.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 383; Violence Against Women Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)–(d).
See RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 386.
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offenders on Tribal lands.67
In a later case, Duro v. Reina, the Supreme Court confronted whether
or not Oliphant’s bar on Tribal Nation authority over non-Native American
individuals extended to Native Americans who were citizens of other Tribal
Nations.68 In Duro, the Supreme Court, following Oliphant, found that Tribal
Nations only had jurisdiction over their own citizens.69 The following year,
Congress overrode this opinion by enacting the “Duro Fix,” which states that
Tribal Nations have criminal jurisdiction over all Native Americans.70
Thirteen years later, in United States v. Lara, the Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether the “Duro Fix” was a delegation of federal
power, thus implicating the Constitution’s double jeopardy protections, or
an exercise of the inherent sovereignty of Tribal Nations.71 The Supreme
Court held that it was an exercise of the inherent sovereignty of Tribal
Nations and stated that Congress has the power to both restrict and relax
restrictions on Tribal sovereignty.72 Thus, while the result of the case was
the affirmation of the inherent sovereignty of Tribal Nations to prosecute
“Natives, regardless of their tribal affiliation[,]” the reasoning implies that
Congress has plenary power over the bounds of this inherent sovereignty.73
Moreover, taken together, Oliphant, the “Duro Fix,” and Lara all result in
the requirement that a racial classification is made in order to discern whether
a Tribal Nation has jurisdiction.74
Nevertheless, there have been some moves by the United States in the
area of criminal law that are in line with self-determination, including
notably, an amendment to the MCA that allows Tribal Nations to opt into
the death penalty.75 “Only one U.S. tribe, the Sac and Fox Nation of

67. Id.
68. Id.; Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
69. Duro, 495 U.S. at 684–85; see also RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 386–87.
70. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 1301); see also RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 387.
71. U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 387–88.
72. Lara, 541 U.S. at 199, 204–05.
73. See id. at 214–15 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As this case should make clear, the time has come
to reexamine the premises and logic of our tribal sovereignty cases. It seems to me that much of the
confusion reflected in our precedent arises from two largely incompatible and doubtful assumptions. First,
Congress (rather than some other part of the Federal Government) can regulate virtually every aspect of
the tribes without rendering tribal sovereignty a nullity. . . . Second, the Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereignty to enforce their criminal laws against their own members.”); see also RICHOTTE, supra note
20, at 393.
74. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 38.
75. Washburn, supra note 17, at 830–31.
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Oklahoma, has opted in.”76 What the Tribal option means is that the federal
government cannot seek the death penalty in cases against Tribal citizens
without the Tribal government’s affirmative consent.77 As will be discussed
later, the MCA is not the only mechanism the United States has utilized to
assert criminal jurisdiction over intra-Tribal crimes occurring on Tribal
lands.78
Nor is it perhaps the mechanism most important to this paper. However,
the MCA is important for understanding the history of the infringements by
the federal government on Tribal nations’ criminal jurisdiction. Its
amendment is also significant evidence of the United States’ recognition of
the importance of respecting Tribal government decision-making when it
comes to whether its citizens live or die.
III. THE CASE OF LEZMOND MITCHELL
In his book, Dr. Keith Richotte asks whether “there [is] something
troubling about American courts continuing to rely upon precedent from a
time in which the federal government was seeking to destroy tribalism.”79
The continued imposition of U.S. criminal law on Tribal Nations,
particularly when, as in the case of Lezmond Mitchell, it goes against the
express wishes and beliefs of the sovereign nation,80 is the direct result of
this precedent.81 Even if this precedent is not directly invoked, it is still the
silent foundation upon which this criminal jurisdiction is built.82 These
precedents are also reinforced through the rhetoric and biases employed in
the prosecution of Indigenous Peoples in the United States.83
As discussed, supra, the policy of the United States towards Tribal
sovereignty over criminal law has transformed dramatically since its
founding, from respecting Tribal jurisdiction over intra-Tribal affairs and
over the crimes of non-Tribal citizens towards Tribal members to respecting
neither.84 Still, even with these significant erosions of Tribal sovereignty
76. Christie Thompson, The Navajo Nation Opposed His Execution. The U.S. Plans to Do It
Anyway, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 2019/09/
17/the-navajo-nation-opposed-his-execution-the-u-s-plans-to-do-it-anyway.
77. Washburn, supra note 17, at 831.
78. See infra Part III.B.
79. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 283.
80. See supra Part II.
81. See supra Part III.
82. See supra Parts II, III.
83. Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, MARQ. L.
REV. 723, 740–41 (2008).
84. See supra Part II.
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over criminal law, the United States appeared to leave intact Tribal
sovereignty when it came to the death penalty and crimes not enumerated in
the MCA.85 Yet, as demonstrated by Lezmond Mitchell’s case, even these
two carveouts are no longer guaranteed.86 Part A of this section sets out the
facts of Lezmond Mitchell’s case and illustrates how his case both
exemplifies the prior history of overinvolvement and continues that history
through the further erosion of sovereign rights. Part B then demonstrates how
the Indian Commerce Clause did not provide sufficient jurisdiction over his
case.
A. The Facts
In 2001, at the age of 20, Lezmond Mitchell along with Johnny Orsinger
murdered two people, including a child, as part of a plan to rob a trading
post.87 All involved were Navajo Nation citizens, and the crime occurred on
land of the Navajo Nation.88 In order to rob the trading post, the perpetrators
needed a car.89 And so Lezmond Mitchell and Johnny Orsinger, after being
picked up by one of their victims, 63-year-old Alyce Slim, stole her car and
murdered her and her granddaughter.90 Alyce Slim was stabbed 33 times and
her granddaughter’s throat was slit two times, after which her head was
bashed in with a rock.91 Their bodies were then mutilated and buried.92
This paper emphasizes these facts because of the perfect victim theory
under international human rights law.93 While in international human rights
advocacy, there is some strategic merit to choosing a “perfect victim” in
order to advance human rights claims, the fact is that human rights apply to
all and should be measured not by the supposedly most deserving victim, but
perhaps by the victim one might consider to be the most undeserving.94 For
if their rights cannot be protected, that undermines the bases for these rights
in the first place. Therefore, this paper highlights these facts because the

85. See supra Part II.
86. See supra Part III.
87. United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 943 (9th Cir. 2007).
88. Id. at 942–44.
89. Id. at 942.
90. Id. at 943.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Steffen Jensena et al., Torture and Ill-Treatment Under Perceived: Human Rights
Documentation and the Poor, 39 HUM. RTS. Q. 393, 411–13 (2017) (discussing the tendencies of human
rights movements to valorize survivors and choose “good victims”).
94. Id. (highlighting how the emphasis on “good victims” results in lower income victims being
under-supported because it is easier to promote the rights of “good victims”).

HOLTZMAN FINAL POST MACRO CH 15.12.22(DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE

12/19/2022 10:11 PM

479

crimes Lezmond Mitchell and Johnny Orsinger committed were undeniably
despicable and worthy of condemnation. Yet, despite the nature of the
crimes, his case nonetheless illustrates the human rights issues and the U.S.
history of overinvolvement in Tribal Nation affairs.
After the murder, Alyce Slim’s truck was found with a “purple latex
glove and Halloween masks inside the truck, as well as Mitchell’s
fingerprints and Slim’s blood.”95 When they received a warrant, two FBI
agents, an evidence technician, and a Navajo criminal investigator searched
Mitchell’s home and found a butterfly knife with Slim’s blood on it as well
as her phone.96 Mitchell was highly compliant with investigators and
repeatedly signed waivers of his Miranda Rights.97 In agreeing to talk,
however, he engaged in strange behavior such as flipping a coin to decide
whether or not he would engage.98 On November 7, 2001, Mitchell appeared
before a Tribal judge, and on November 21, a federal indictment was
issued.99 However, “[o]n July 2, 2002, a superceding indictment was
returned charging Mitchell and Orsinger with murder; felony murder,
robbery; carjacking resulting in death; several robbery-related counts;
kidnapping; and felony murder, kidnapping.”100 Then two months later “[o]n
September 12, 2002, the government filed a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty as to Mitchell, based on the 18 U.S.C. § 2119 charge of carjacking
resulting in death.”101
Commentators have noted that superseding indictments have
increasingly become common practice, where previously the charges
brought against a defendant would rarely change.102 Additionally, Lezmond
Mitchell’s trial occurred during a period that was characterized by a federal
government policy, under Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, of
aggressively promoting the death penalty.103 Ashcroft reportedly reversed
95. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 931, 944.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 944–45.
98. Id. at 944.
99. Id. at 945.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (explaining that if death results from the carjacking, the defendant
may be sentenced to death).
102. Joel Cohen, Can the Superseding Indictment Process Be Abused?, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 9, 2016, 3:00
AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202749145996/Can-the-Superseding-Indictme
nt-Process-Be-Abused/. Whereas in 1976, a survey of 11 districts reported that between 0 and 7% of
defendants had superseding indictments, depending on the district. Robert L. Misner, District Court
Compliance with the Speedy Trial Act of 1974: The Ninth Circuit Experience, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 31
(1977).
103. Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Aggressively Pursues Death Penalty, WASH. POST (July 1, 2002),
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the decisions of federal prosecutors not to seek the death penalty 12 times
between 2001 and 2002, including where there was a tentative plea
agreement.104 He also approved the death penalty in almost half of all death
penalty eligible cases, with a significant racial bias.105
Ashcroft’s time as Attorney General was also marked by the beginning
of a federal practice of seeking the death penalty “for a crime that could not
be punished by death in the state where it occurred.”106 But while the
incursion on federalism is in some ways analogous to the incursion on Tribal
sovereignty, they diverge in the human rights violations specific to
Indigenous Peoples that characterize Lezmond Mitchell’s case, and the
different histories of how states and Tribal Nations became a part of the
United States. Infringements on federalism do not inherently raise questions
of self-determination and cultural rights. Additionally, states opted into the
federal system by ratifying the Constitution,107 whereas Tribal Nations did
not consent to the application of federal criminal law against their citizens.108
At trial, only one member of Lezmond Mitchell’s jury was Native
American—the other eleven jurors were white.109 These circumstances were
partly due to the fact that the trial occurred over 300 miles away from the
capital of the Navajo Nation.110 Other barriers included the court’s failure to
provide translation services and the systematic removal of Native Americans
from the venire based on their “Navajo languages and/or beliefs.”111 In fact,
the only reason even one Native American was on the jury was due to a
successful Batson challenge by Lezmond Mitchell.112
In closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly used racist language
and references.113 For example, the prosecutor stated that “[p]erhaps years
ago, Tombstone, he would have been taken out back, strung up. He would
have gotten a trial, nothing like this. We have been at this for seven
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/07/01/ashcroft-aggressively-pursues-deathpenalty /09855058-4080-44f8-ae9e-57cbd1d8b6cf/.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Coming Federalism Battle in the War over the Death
Penalty, 70 ARK. L. REV. 309, 312 (2017).
107. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
108. See supra Part II.
109. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Mitchell v. United States, 971 F.3d 993 (2020) (No. 1817031).
110. Id. at 4.
111. Id. at 4, 23.
112. Id. at 23.
113. See United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 995 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he government’s closing
argument was riddled with comments that should not have been made.”).
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weeks.”114 And the Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging that the “closing
argument was riddled with comments that should not have been made[,]”
determined that these repeated invocations of racial biases and racial
violence were not sufficient to merit an error.115 Rather, the court maintained
that the crimes, and the weight of the evidence, were so egregious that these
derogatory statements could not have impacted the jurors enough to have
made any difference in his case.116 It is also important to note that Lezmond
Mitchell was not present, as he requested to be absent, and the court granted
his request.117 And so as the dissent put it, “the jury was not required to face
him in the immediate period before it decided that he should die.”118
In his 2007 appeal, Mitchell challenged his conviction of carjacking
resulting in death, as well as the application of the FDPA119 to “carjackings
committed by one Indian against other Indians in Indian country.”120 His
argument was in part based on the fact that “the Navajo Nation never opted
into the federal capital punishment scheme.”121 Additionally, he argued that
the MCA was the only basis for “federal criminal jurisdiction over intraIndian crimes” and that he therefore could not be convicted of this crime as
it is not included in the MCA.122 But the court, following its own precedents,
dismissed this argument, finding that federal crimes of general applicability
could be applied to intra-Indian crimes.123 Mitchell also pointed to Ex Parte
Crow Dog124 to argue that because the carjacking statute did not specifically
provide for intra-Indian criminal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction was lacking.125
The court dismissed this argument as well, asserting that statutes that are
silent on their applicability are presumptively applicable in these cases.126
The basis for jurisdiction here is the Indian Commerce Clause.127 In United
114. Id.; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Mitchell v. United States, 971 F.3d 993 (2020)
(No. 18-17031).
115. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 995–96.
116. Id. Note that the dissent agreed that the racist statements did not amount to an error on their
own, but believed that in connection with other errors, including Lezmond Mitchell’s absence from the
trial, that an error should have been found. Id. at 1010–14 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 985–86.
118. Id. at 1013.
119. Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3599.
120. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 946.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 946–47.
123. Id. (citing United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1350–51 (9th Cir. 1997)).
124. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
125. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 946.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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States v. Kagama, the case through which the constitutionality of the MCA
was affirmed, the Supreme Court dismissed the Indian Commerce Clause as
a basis for criminal jurisdiction.128 However, in Mitchell’s case, it was used
in exactly that way.
The Navajo Nation itself vehemently opposed the imposition of the
death penalty against Lezmond Mitchell.129 The Navajo Nation held hearings
after the trial to determine whether or not to support the death penalty and
concluded that it would not.130 In addition to the Navajo Nation’s collective
commitment to opposing the death penalty, the victims’ family members also
testified individually against the death penalty.131 In 2001, “the U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the District of Arizona inquired whether the Navajo
Nation would support” the death penalty for Lezmond Mitchell.132 The
Attorney General for the Navajo Nation and the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Navajo Nation both replied in the negative.133 The Attorney
General for the Navajo Nation, moreover, “formally requested that the U.S.
Attorney’s Office not seek the death penalty against Mitchell.”134 Based on
these communications, the local U.S. Attorney’s Office recommended that
the death penalty should not be sought in this case.135 However, given
Ashcroft’s aggressive policy of promoting the death penalty, he overrode this
recommendation.136
Following Lezmond Mitchell’s 2007 appeal, there were 16 more court
actions, including where the Supreme Court denied two petitions for a writ
of certiorari and his request for a Stay of Execution.137 Particularly
128. 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886).
129. Fletcher & Begay, supra note 5.
130. Appellant’s Replacement Opening Brief at 95, United States v. Mitchell, No. CA-03-99010 (9th
Cir. Aug. 7, 2006), 2006 WL 2951921.
131. Id.
132. IACHR, Mitchell, supra note 16, ¶ 45.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. ¶ 46.
136. Fletcher & Begay, supra note 5; Eggen, supra note 103.
137. Mitchell v. United States, 553 U.S. 1094 (2008); Mitchell v. United States, No. CV–09–8089–
PCT–MHM, 2009 WL 4694010 (D. Ariz. Dec. 4, 2009); Mitchell v. United States, No. CV–09–8089–
PCT–MHM, 2009 WL 3219297 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2009); Mitchell v. United States, No. CV–09–8089–
PCT–MHM, 2009 WL 2905958 (D. Ariz. Sept. 04, 2009); Mitchell v. United States, Nos. CV–09–8089–
PCT–MHM, CR–01–1062–PCT–MHM, 2010 WL 3895691 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2010); Mitchell v. United
States, No. CV–09–8089–PCT–MHM, 2010 WL 5342960 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2010); Mitchell v. United
States, 790 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2015); Mitchell v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 38 (2016); Mitchell v. United
States, No. CV-09-08089-PCT-DGC, 2018 WL 4467897 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2018); Mitchell v. United
States, No. CV-09-08089-PCT-DGC, 2019 WL 4141063 (D. Ariz. Aug. 30, 2019); Mitchell v. United
States, 140 S. Ct. 2624 (2020); Mitchell v. United States, No. CV 20-8217-PCT-DGC, 2020 WL 4940909
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noteworthy is that Lezmond Mitchell’s case was heard by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which issued a Report
on Admissibility and the Merits on July 14, 2020 and then issued its Final
Report on August 12, 2020.138 The IACHR found in relevant part that the
United States had violated the Navajo Nation’s sovereignty in sentencing
Lezmond Mitchell to death;139 that he was not afforded adequate assistance
of counsel;140 that his right to life had been violated;141 and that he had been
subject to cruel, infamous or unusual punishment,142 as a result of being held
on death row for 18 years.143 But the District Court determined that IACHR
decisions did not bind it, but were purely “recommendations for human
rights improvements.”144 Four days after the District Court dismissed the
IACHR’s decision as nonbinding, the Supreme Court issued a late-night
denial of his request for a Stay of Execution.145 The next day, Lezmond
Mitchell was put to death.146
(D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2020); Mitchell v. United States, 971 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2020); Mitchell v. United
States, 2020 WL 4921988 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2020); United States v. Mitchell, 971 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.
2020); United States v. Mitchell, No. CR-01-01062-001-PCT-DGC, 2020 WL 4698056 (D. Ariz. Aug.
13, 2020); Mitchell v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 216 (2020); Mitchell v. United States, 958 F.3d 775 (9th
Cir. 2020).
138. See Mitchell v. United States, No. CV 20-8217-PCT-DGC2020, WL 4921988, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 21, 2020); IACHR, Mitchell, supra note 16, ¶¶ 139, 141.
139. IACHR, Mitchell, supra note 16, ¶ 106.
140. Id. ¶ 120.
141. Id. ¶ 138.
142. O.A.S. Res. XXX, American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man arts. XXV, XXVI
(May 2, 1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OAS/Ser./L/V/I.4 rev. 7 (Feb. 2, 2000) [hereinafter American Declaration].
143. IACHR, Mitchell, supra note 16, ¶ 135. The Commission also quoted the UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture, who stated that
Individuals held in solitary confinement suffer extreme forms of sensory deprivation, anxiety
and exclusion, clearly surpassing lawful conditions of deprivation of liberty. Solitary
confinement, in combination with the foreknowledge of death and the uncertainty of whether
or when an execution is to take place, contributes to the risk of serious and irreparable mental
and physical harm and suffering to the inmate. Solitary confinement used on death row is by
definition prolonged and indefinite and thus constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment or even torture.
Id. (quoting Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment), Interim Report, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. A/67/279 (Aug. 9, 2012)).
144. See Mitchell v. United States, No. CV 20-8217-PCT-DGC2020, WL 4921988, at *6 (D. Ariz.,
Aug. 21, 2020). This attitude by the United States is not surprising, as this has been the view taken on by
the United States in other cases as well. See IACHR, Dann v. United States, ¶ 176, Report No. 75/02,
doc. 1, rev. 1 (Dec. 27, 2002) (“[T]he United States stated that it ‘respectfully declines to take any further
actions to comply with the Commission’s recommendations’”). Note that in its statement, the United
States used the word “recommendation” rather than a more authoritative word like “order,” showing its
treatment of the nature of the Commission’s decisions. Id.
145. Fuchs, supra note 1.
146. Id.
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B. The Extra-(Un)Constitutional Imposition of the Death Penalty on
Indigenous Peoples in the United States
In Lezmond Mitchell’s case, the District Court found support for
jurisdiction over the carjacking charge from the Indian Commerce Clause.147
Since the enactment of the MCA,148 the United States has asserted the right
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over intra-Indian crimes on tribal lands,149
yet there is no real constitutional basis for doing so.150 In Lezmond Mitchell’s
case, however, the federal government did not rely on a crime enumerated in
the MCA at all, but instead charged him with carjacking resulting in death,
a crime of general applicability.151
Courts have differed on whether the MCA is limited to the crimes
enumerated in the statute.152 This is in part because the General Crimes Act
(GCA), which immediately precedes the MCA in the United States Code,
provides that general federal laws would not apply to intra-Indian crimes
committed on Tribal lands, where “the exclusive jurisdiction over such
offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.”153 The Fourth
Circuit has interpreted the MCA and GCA to provide for criminal
jurisdiction in these cases only over crimes enumerated by the MCA,
whereas the Second and Seventh Circuits presume Tribal authority in the
case of an unenumerated crime, with a carve-out for federal jurisdiction for
“peculiarly federal crimes.”154 These “peculiarly federal crimes” include
assaulting a federal officer or “defrauding the U.S. government.”155 But the
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits presume federal jurisdiction in the
case of generally applicable crimes.156 Here, they have interpreted the
MCA/GCA to only have a “situs” requirement, which would be irrelevant in
a case involving generally applicable statutes.157
Regardless of how the scope of the MCA is interpreted, the question
remains as to where federal power over Tribal Nations derives from. Without
a legitimate basis for such authority, Congress would be without power to
147. United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 946–48 (9th Cir. 2007).
148. Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018).
149. See supra Part II.
150. See supra Part II.
151. James Winston King, Legend of Crow Dog: An Examination of Jurisdiction over Intra-Tribal
Crimes Not Covered by the Major Crimes Act, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1481 (1999).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1482; General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994).
154. King, supra note 151, at 1482.
155. Id. at 1499.
156. Id. at 1481.
157. Id. at 1503.
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impose federal criminal jurisdiction on Tribal Nations, including the MCA
and GCA. Indeed, as discussed supra, the federal government has not always
seen itself as having plenary power over Tribal Nations.158 And when courts
began following the modern plenary power doctrine, they read it as deriving
from “tribes’ dependent status” and the Indian Commerce Clause.159 Yet, the
Court that established this doctrine supported only the first and not the
second basis for plenary power and found no justification within the
Constitution itself.160 While some scholars posit that the “tribes’ dependent
status” could have been seen as legitimate in the context of a lack of Tribal
resources to maintain their own criminal justice system,161 this answer is
unsatisfactory as it leaves room for the “racialist paradigm that denigrated
Native peoples and their claims to nationhood.”162
This concept of “dependent status” is completely absent from the
Constitution, “grounded not in text but in problematic readings of history.”163
Yet, “dependent status” is still utilized by the courts, including notably in
United States v. Lara, where Justice Breyer found Congressional power due
to Tribal Nations’ status as “dependent sovereign[s] that . . . [are] not. . .
State[s].”164 But racism, and extraconstitutional interpretations of history, are
not sufficient or legitimate bases for plenary power over another sovereign.
And here again it is important to question whether “there [is] something
troubling about American courts continuing to rely upon precedent from a
time in which the federal government was seeking to destroy tribalism.”165
The argument that the Indian Commerce Clause provides plenary power
is only slightly distinct from the “dependent status” basis. In United States
v. Kagama, the case wherein the Supreme Court first upheld the MCA, it
158. See discussion supra Part II.
159. Stapleton, supra note 8, at 339.
160. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 139; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886)
(holding that the Indian Commerce Clause did not support the MCA but that plenary power could instead
be supported by factors outside of the constitution including dependent status).
161. Stapleton, supra note 8, at 341.
162. Ablavsky, supra note 49, at 1081. Also note that under the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, using the concept of dependent status to subjugate
Tribal Nations could be interpreted as a violation of self-determination rights, assuming that Tribal
Nations are read to fall under this Declaration. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, ¶ 3 (Dec. 14, 1960) [hereinafter Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples]. This is because the dependent status argument for plenary power is
equivalent to arguing for plenary power on the basis of the “[i]nadequacy of political, economic, social
or educational preparedness.” Id.
163. Ablavsky, supra note 49, at 1086. For example, readings of history that utilize racist theories,
by characterizing Tribal Nations as structurally subordinate “wards” of the U.S. Id. at 1079.
164. United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628, 1635 (2004).
165. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 283.
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rejected the Indian Commerce Clause as a basis for plenary power, instead
relying on the racist classifications of Tribal Nations as “wards” of the
United States.166 The subsequent move by the modern Supreme Court to rely
on the Indian Commerce Clause is not grounded in history or originalist
readings of the Constitution,167 but is instead “tenuous at best and
disingenuous at worst.”168 Rather, the reliance on the Indian Commerce
Clause is utilized as a mechanism through which to distance the Court from
the doctrine’s racist roots, while it “implicitly continues to embrace the extraconstitutional principles of Kagama and its progeny.”169 Therefore, the
Indian Commerce Clause is not a true source of power, but instead a
convenient shadow justification for the underlying colonialist history that
has led to the modern conception of plenary power. And without a source of
power to support the imposition of criminal law, the United States was
without power to prosecute Lezmond Mitchell at all. While this paper is
focused primarily on federal overinvolvement in the criminal justice affairs
of Tribal Nations, the lack of legal basis for plenary power has far greater
implications. In fact, it calls into question the legitimacy of any
nonconsensual regulation of Tribal Nations’ internal affairs.
IV. THE RIGHT TO TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS
The persistent overinvolvement of the federal government in Tribal
Nation affairs as exemplified in Lezmond Mitchell’s case is questionable
domestically.170 But as will be illustrated in the next two sections, the federal
government’s actions also have significant implications under international
law. As outlined supra,171 in the United States, Tribal Nations are not
considered foreign entities but rather are seen as “quasi-sovereign,”172 as
“domestic dependent nations,”173 or existing as “distinct political
communities”174 that have the right of self-government with a number of

166. Speed, supra note 17, at 481.
167. See Ablavsky, supra note 49, at 1084 (noting that the Indian Commerce Clause was not read by
the founders to confer plenary power).
168. Speed, supra note 17, at 485.
169. Id.; Ablavsky, supra note 49, at 1084.
170. See supra Part III.
171. See supra Part II.
172. Morton v. Mancari, 554 U.S. 417, 417 (1974).
173. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831).
174. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832).
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restrictions.175 However, under international law, Tribal Nations are afforded
rights and their sovereign authority is recognized in a number of treaties and
documents.176 These include three pieces of international law that are binding
on the United States: the United Nations Charter, ICCPR, and ICERD.177
These pieces of international law also guarantee the human rights of the
individuals within Indigenous communities, including the right to life and
the right to be free from racial discrimination.178
This section briefly discusses the ICCPR and ICERD, and then
concludes with a discussion of the relevant international law on the right to
self-determination. In looking to these frameworks, this paper will also note
their intersections and the gaps they leave. The following section considers
these laws in the context of Lezmond Mitchell’s case and the
overinvolvement of the federal government in Tribal Nation affairs.
A. Foundations: ICERD and the ICCPR
Two foundational international treaties relevant to this paper include
the ICCPR and the ICERD.179 In the ICCPR, the most relevant provisions
are articles 6(1), 10(1), 14(1), 26, and 27.180 Article 6(1) states that “[e]very
human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”181 Further, article 10(1)
provides that, “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”182
Article 14(1) states that:
[a]ll persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by

175. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 1628, 1630 (2004) (noting that Tribal Nations have a right
to self-government, but that Congress has the plenary power to restrict “tribal sovereign authority.”).
176. See generally G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]; e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2 (declaring the right to selfdetermination); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly
Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct.
24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations].
177. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2; ICERD, supra note 15; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 27, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 80 Stat. 271, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
178. ICERD, supra note 15; ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 6, ¶ 1.
179. ICCPR, supra note 177; ICERD, supra note 15.
180. ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 6, ¶ 1, art. 10, ¶ 1, art. 14, ¶ 1, art. 26, art. 27.
181. Id. art. 6, ¶ 1.
182. Id. art. 10, ¶ 1.
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law.183

Article 26 provides that:
[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.184

And finally, article 27 protects the linguistic, religious, and cultural rights of
minority groups.185
ICERD defines “racial discrimination” as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour,
descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.186

Additionally, ICERD requires that states “not permit public authorities or
public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial
discrimination.”187 It also provides for “[t]he right to equal treatment before
the tribunals and all other organs administering justice” and requires states
to provide for “effective protection and remedies.”188
B. Self-Determination and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The UN Charter, binding on all UN member nations (including the
U.S.), states that one of its purposes is “[t]o develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples.”189 Beyond the UN Charter, the right to selfdetermination is included in a number of other treaties including the ICCPR
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).190 This right to self-determination has been developed over time

183. Id. art. 14, ¶ 1.
184. Id. art. 26.
185. Id. art. 27.
186. ICERD, supra note 15, art. 1, ¶ 1.
187. Id. art. 4(c).
188. Id. arts. 5(a), 6.
189. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2, art. 2.
190. ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 1, ¶ 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights art. 1, ¶ 2, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. Note that
while the United Nations Charter and ICCPR are binding on the United States, the U.S. has not ratified
the ICESCR. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. TREATY
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to create a set of international rules and mechanisms on the rights of
peoples,191 although its precise content is still subject to debate.192 A people
can include citizens of a former colony, of a state subject to “foreign
conquest” or “alien subjugation,” or religious, ethnic, social, and other
minority groups.193
As applied to Indigenous Peoples, the nature of self-determination has
been a subject of significant debate, particularly because self-determination
has been read to provide secession rights to colonial and non-self-governing
territories.194 In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly passed the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples stating that the UN Charter prohibits “[t]he subjection of peoples to
alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation,” and that these acts violate
fundamental human rights.195 The Declaration went on to define selfdetermination as including the right to determine political status and ordered
states to take “immediate steps” to transfer all power to “trust” and other
non-self-governing territories.196 Indigenous Peoples were excluded from
this conception utilizing the “so-called blue-, or salt-water, thesis[,]” which
required that there be a “blue- or salt-water between the colonizing country
and the colony or at least a geographically discrete set of boundaries.”197

COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter= 4&
clang=_en (last visited Dec. 20, 2020); Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&
chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) [hereinafter Status of the ICCPR].
191. See Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 162, ¶¶ 1, 5; Friendly
Relations, supra note 176, ¶ 1 (reaffirming the right to self-determination and describing modes of
political status); Aaland Islands Question, supra note 10; Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrc-subsidiaries/expert-mechanism-on-indigenous-peoples
(last visited Mar. 20, 2022); Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-indigenous-peoples (last visited Mar. 20, 2022).
192. See, e.g., Christine Bell & Kathleen Cavanaugh, ‘Constructive Ambiguity’ or Internal SelfDetermination? Self-Determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement, 22 FORDHAM
INT’L L. REV. 1345, 1351 (1998) (“The ‘lacunae, ambiguities and loopholes’ in the current legal
regulation of self-determination leave it open to other groups, such as ethnic or national minority groups
within state territories, to claim a right to self-determination.”).
193. Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 162, ¶ 1; Report of the
International Committee on Aaland Islands, supra note 10, at 6.
194. See, e.g., JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1996); Ernest
Duga Titanji, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination versus Secession: One Coin, Two
Faces, 9 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 52, 61 (2009); Hurst Hannum, Minorities, Indigenous Peoples, and SelfDetermination, 26 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 1, 9 (1994).
195. Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 162, ¶ 1.
196. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5.
197. Andrew Erueti, The Politics of International Indigenous Rights, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 569, 578–
79 (2017).
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Therefore, Indigenous Peoples were not considered within this selfdetermination framework, in spite of histories of colonialism impacting
Indigenous Peoples.198
Indigenous Peoples of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States (CANZUS states) have advocated for a reading of self-determination
within an anti-colonization context, which would entitle them to claim selfdetermination rights in line with those afforded to previously colonized
states.199 As noted by Professor Andrew Eruiti, the anti-colonialism context
is particularly relevant to Indigenous Peoples within these states due to the
history of “treaty making and treaty breaking, and international law’s refusal
to recognize their sovereign status.”200 The alternative reading of selfdetermination, which is more accepted as related to Indigenous Peoples, is
internal self-determination which includes “a people’s pursuit of its political,
economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state.”201
Emerging doctrine, moreover, does not restrict a right to secession to
colonial territories, but rather supports the idea of remedial secession.202
Remedial secession is the idea that serious human rights infringements or
denials of internal self-determination can provide for the right to
secession.203 This emerging doctrine is supported in part by a 1970 UN
Declaration which further elaborated on the rights encapsulated within the
right to self-determination.204 This 1970 Declaration does not authorize
secession as applied to states that are “in compliance with the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory, without
distinction as to race, creed or colour.”205 This paragraph has been read to
imply a right to remedial secession where “a government does not represent
the whole population, or discriminates on the grounds of ‘race, creed or

198. Id. at 570, 579 (“These advocates pointed to their first peoples’ status and historical experience
of colonization and intensive settlement.”).
199. Id. at 570, 580–81 (“As state-like peoples subject to colonization, equality demanded that
indigenous peoples be entitled to self-determination alongside other peoples.”).
200. Id. at 591.
201. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R 217, 282 (Can.).
202. Id. at 285.
203. Id.; see also Glen Anderson, A Post-Millennial Inquiry into the United Nations Law of SelfDetermination: A Right to Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession?, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1183, 1221
(2016).
204. Friendly Relations, supra note 176.
205. Id.
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colour.’”206 Further, according to this Declaration, any interference with such
an exercise of self-determination would constitute a violation of the UN
Charter.207
In 2007, the UN General Assembly moved to create a set of protections
specific to Indigenous Peoples by adopting the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).208 While it is not legally
binding, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has
asserted that “[UNDRIP] is a standard setting resolution of profound
significance as it reflects a wide consensus at the global level on the
minimum content of the rights of indigenous peoples.”209 Along with
reaffirming the right to self-determination, UNDRIP notes that the right to
self-determination includes “the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs.”210 UNDRIP also
emphasizes that “indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decisionmaking in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedure, as well as to
maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.”211
And while UNDRIP is not itself considered binding, the Human Rights
Council’s Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has stated
that the Declaration should be used to interpret other human rights treaties.212
Accordingly, the Expert Mechanism has found the duty to “include
indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them” to be a requirement under
article 27 of the ICCPR.213 Furthermore, cultural rights, as elaborated on in
UNDRIP, were found to be a core component of self-determination.214 Note
that while the views of the Expert Mechanisms are not binding, they
206. Anderson, supra note 203, at 1215–17 (citing Friendly Relations, supra note 176).
207. Friendly Relations, supra note 176, ¶ 1.
208. UNDRIP, supra note 176; RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 660.
209. Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), Report to the
General Assembly, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/72/186 (July 21, 2017).
210. UNDRIP, supra note 176, arts. 3–4.
211. Id. art. 18.
212. Hum. Rts. Council, Access to Justice in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/EMRIP/2013/2 (Apr. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Access to
Justice]; Hum. Rts. Council, Role of Languages and Culture in the Promotion and Protection of the Rights
and Identity of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/53 (Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Role of
Languages and Culture].
213. Role of Languages and Culture, supra note 212, ¶ 10; see also Food and Agricultural
Organization [FAO], Free Prior and Informed Consent Manual, at 14, I6190E/1/10.16 (2016) (noting
that a right to participation is rooted in the right to self-determination and individual autonomy); Poma
Poma v. Peru, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., ¶ 7.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (2009) (finding that
art. 27 of the ICCPR requires the inclusion of minority groups in decisions that affect them).
214. Role of Languages and Culture, supra note 212, ¶ 20.
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constitute authoritative statements on the content of international law.215
In the realm of criminal law, the United States is not alone in its
disregard for Indigenous norms and criminal justice systems.216
Internationally, Indigenous Peoples “struggle to have their institutions and
systems, including legal systems, traditional laws and approaches to justice,
recognized.”217 Additionally, even where they are recognized they are often
subject to limitations or are overridden by a country’s laws when there is a
conflict.218 And where both Indigenous and state systems govern, Indigenous
individuals may be subject to prosecution under two systems, particularly
“where the State-based system does not recognize the indigenous peoples’
system.”219 A 2013 Expert Mechanism study found that self-determination
provides Indigenous Peoples with the right to “maintain and strengthen
indigenous legal institutions[] and to apply their own customs and laws.”220
It also found that cultural rights include “recognition and practice of
[Indigenous] justice systems . . . [and a] recognition of [Indigenous]
traditional customs, values and languages by courts and legal procedures.”221
The study also provided a number of examples of states making positive
strides in implementing these norms, including Greenland and Malaysia,
which have codified Indigenous laws, and Canada, which requires courts to
recognize and consider customary laws and traditions when applying the
Canadian Human Rights Act.222
However, as hinted at by the Expert Mechanism, significant gaps are
created by the intersection of domestic and international law in their
treatment of Indigenous Peoples, given, for instance, that an Indigenous

215. Hum. Rts. Council Res. 33/25, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/33/25, at 2 (Oct. 5, 2016) (“[W]ithin its
mandate, the Expert Mechanism shall determine its own methods of work, although the Expert
Mechanism may not adopt resolutions or decisions.”); see also MARKUS VORDERMAYER-RIEMER, NONREGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 41–42 (2021) (“At the least, such
pronouncements by nontreaty based human rights organs may come close to ‘judicial decisions and
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations’ in the sense of Article 38(1)(d)
of the Statute of the ICJ and thus qualify as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.’”).
216. Access to Justice, supra note 212, ¶ 53 (citing Gabriela Carina Knaul de Albuquerque e Silva
(Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers), Mission to Mexico, ¶¶ 80–81,
A/HRC/17/30/Add.3, annex (Apr. 18, 2011)).
217. Id. ¶ 55.
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶ 57.
220. Id. ¶ 12. The Inter-American Commission has made similar findings on the duty of a state to
respect Indigenous laws, legal systems, and cultural practices under the right to self-determination and
cultural rights. IACHR, Mitchell, supra note 16, ¶ 85.
221. Id. ¶ 28.
222. Id. ¶¶ 54, 60–61.
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Person could be subject to two sovereigns for one crime.223 And when
considering how ICERD interacts with the rights of Indigenous Peoples, a
right to equality based on race224 does not necessarily cover discrimination
based on Indigenous status. It would not, for instance, seem to cover the
exclusion of Native Americans from a jury based on their cultural beliefs on
the death penalty.225 It is also not clear that Indigenous Peoples are provided
with any effective remedies through these mechanisms. On the domestic
level, as was discussed supra, while even domestic law cuts against the
implementation of the death penalty against Lezmond Mitchell,226 courts still
had the power to enforce the death penalty. And, on an international level,
even when Indigenous Peoples are able to access an international
mechanism, states may choose to ignore the decisions of the international
bodies, as the United States did in the case of Lezmond Mitchell.227 Finally,
to the extent that human rights treaties can be interpreted through UNDRIP,
because it is not itself binding, the provisions for the creation of new
enforcement mechanisms and positive obligations are likely not
enforceable.228
The United States was notably one of four countries to vote against
UNDRIP.229 While the United States eventually changed its position, it
continues to emphasize that UNDRIP is not legally binding and has only
“moral and political force.”230 The rights proposed by UNDRIP are
numerous.231 And while bold, as UNDRIP states in closing, “[t]he rights
recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival, dignity
and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.”232
V. THE DEATH OF LEZMOND MITCHELL: A VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND OTHER INNUMERABLE
223. Access to Justice, supra note 212, ¶ 57.
224. ICERD, supra note 15, arts. 4, 5(a), 6.
225. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23, Mitchell v. United States, 971 F.3d 993 (2020) (No. 1817031).
226. See supra Part III.B.
227. See Mitchell v. United States, No. CV 20-8217-PCT-DGC2020, 2020 WL 4921988, at *6 (D.
Ariz., Aug. 21, 2020).
228. UNDRIP, supra note 176, arts. 2, 11, 27, 39.
229. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 664.
230. Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1 (2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/
documents/organization/184099.pdf.
231. UNDRIP, supra note 176.
232. Id. art. 43. And as Justice Gorsuch stated in Washington v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000,
1021 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring), “[i]t is the least we can do.”

HOLTZMAN FINAL POST MACRO CH 15.12.22 (DO NOT DELETE)

494

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/19/2022 10:11 PM

[Vol 32:467

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Under international law, the Navajo Nation has full authority over its
own political status and criminal justice affairs.233 In contrast, in the United
States, the courts and Congress have both defined the status and powers of
Tribal Nations, without consulting with the Tribal Nations themselves.234
According to Supreme Court caselaw, Congress’s power over Tribal Nations
is plenary, leaving it to Congress to expand the “inherent sovereignty” of
Tribal Nations.235 However, the constitutionality of this power is suspect.
International law also cuts against such plenary power, as it provides Tribal
Nations, including the Navajo Nation, with the authority to determine their
own political status.236 As will be discussed in this section, international law
gave the Navajo Nation the power to decide whether Lezmond Mitchell
received the death penalty. The United States’ disregard for the sovereign’s
will, and actions taken in accordance with this disregard, amounted to
violations of the Navajo Nation’s right to self-determination and other
provisions of human rights law.
The Navajo Nation, as a people, has the right to self-determination that
is binding on the United States under the UN Charter and the ICCPR.237
Under black letter international law, this includes the right to determine its
political status, though falls short of a right to secede.238 However, under the
anti-colonialism theory of Indigenous rights, the Navajo Nation arguably has
self-determination rights in line with those of colonial territories, meaning
they are both internal and external in nature.239 Thus, at its strongest
invocation, the rights of the Navajo Nation could also include the ability to
secede entirely from the United States.240 Under both black letter
international law and the anti-colonialism theory, any interference with the
Navajo Nation’s right to self-determination is a violation of the UN
Charter.241

233. See supra Part IV.B.
234. RICHOTTE, supra note 20, at 382.
235. Id.; United States v. Lara, 451 U.S. 182, 199, 204–05 (1981).
236. ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 1, ¶ 1; Victoria Tauli-Corpuz (Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples), Report to the General Assembly, ¶¶ 35, A/73/176 (July 17, 2018) (“[Selfdetermination] is considered a foundational right of indigenous peoples, because it affirms their right to
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”); UNDRIP supra note 176, art. 3.
237. See supra Part IV.B.
238. See supra Part IV.B.
239. See supra Part IV.B; Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 162, ¶ 1.
240. See supra Part IV.B.
241. See supra Part IV.B.
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Moreover, unlike ICESCR, the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples does not appear to be
limited to progressive realization.242 Many of the rights included in ICESCR
are subject to progressive realization, meaning that they require that “steps
be taken” to fulfill them though the rights can be fulfilled over time.243 In
contrast, the Declaration says that states must take “immediate steps . . . to
transfer all powers to the peoples of [colonial] territories, without any
conditions or reservations.”244 The United States under the anti-colonialism
theory then was under an obligation to transfer all power to the Navajo
Nation, and a failure to do so would constitute a violation of the UN
Charter.245
Under black letter international law, the United States is also barred
from derogating from the right to self-determination absent communication
to the Secretary-General of the UN that such a derogation has been made
because of a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” under
article 4 of the ICCPR.246 Arguably, once the United States has instituted
measures to realize the self-determination rights of the Navajo Nation, it
cannot act in ways that constitute a derogation of that transfer, absent the
circumstances outlined in article 4 of the ICCPR. There do not appear to be
any relevant derogation communications. Under the MCA,247 the United
States did engage in an act that further realized the Navajo Nation’s selfdetermination rights by providing an opt-in provision to the death penalty.
This act is in line with the right to self-determination, given that it provides
the Navajo Nation with autonomy over its internal affairs.248 The Navajo
Nation chose definitively to opt-out of the death penalty.249 And just as the
MCA can be seen as a step forward in realizing the Navajo Nation’s right to
self-determination, the execution of Lezmond Mitchell,250 against the
express wishes of the Navajo Nation, can be seen as a derogation from the
right. Therefore, in its decision in this case, the United States walked back
242. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties’
Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), ¶¶ 9, 14, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838e10.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2020).
243. Id.; ICESCR, supra note 190, art. 2, ¶ 1.
244. Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 162, ¶ 5.
245. Id. ¶ 1.
246. ICCPR, supra note 177, art. 4.
247. Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
248. UNDRIP, supra note 176, arts. 3–4.
249. See supra Part III. The provision provides for Tribal Nations to opt-in rather than opt-out, though
here the Navajo Nation also definitively opted out through their hearings and communications to the U.S.
Attorney’s Office. See supra Part III; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3598.
250. Fuchs, supra note 1.
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power that it had transferred, in violation of the right to self-determination
and the prohibition from derogating from rights absent a public emergency.
Like the anti-colonialism theory, UNDRIP is also not itself binding.251
However, the Expert Mechanism has stated that it should be used to interpret
other human rights treaties.252 While the views of the Expert Mechanism are
not binding, they remain authoritative statements of the content of
international law.253 Thus, while the new rights UNDRIP enumerates may
not yet be legally binding, the rights contained in the Declaration that simply
expand on rights contained in legally binding instruments are arguably
binding or strongly authoritative.254 Specifically, UNDRIP expands on the
content of the right to self-determination. For example, self-determination as
interpreted using UNDRIP encompasses the right for Indigenous Peoples to
be included “in decisions that affect them.”255 Further, self-determination
and cultural rights have been read to require the recognition of and respect
for Indigenous legal bodies, languages, and traditions.256
As a result, the Navajo Nation’s right to self-determination includes the
right to determine its political status, whether as a state or in any other
political form it chooses.257 This right to determine political status on its own,
but also in connection with the specific rights in the realm of criminal law,
requires that the Navajo Nation have the final word in determining the
criminal justice destiny of its citizens.258 It also implies that the Navajo
Nation has the right, if not the duty, as a sovereign to ensure the human rights
of its people, including the right to life. Therefore, the Navajo Nation has the
right to determine whether its citizens live or die. For that reason, the
imposition of the death penalty on Lezmond Mitchell, expressly against the
wishes of the Navajo Nation,259 violated its right to self-determination. And
this violation is in turn a violation of the UN Charter and ICCPR, given that
such a violation constitutes an interference with the Navajo Nation’s exercise
of self-determination.260
The United States committed additional violations of the Navajo
Nation’s self-determination and language and cultural rights throughout the
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra note 219.
See supra Part IV.B.
Role of Languages and Culture, supra note 212, ¶ 10; UNDRIP, supra note 176, art.18.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.B.
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process of Lezmond Mitchell’s trial. The Navajo Nation has a right to be part
of “decisions that affect them.”261 A criminal trial, especially one carrying
the possibility of the death penalty, constitutes a decision-making process
that implicates the rights of the Navajo Nation under ICCPR articles 2 (selfdetermination) and 27 (language and cultural rights).262 At stake in Lezmond
Mitchell’s case was whether the United States could impose the death
penalty on a citizen of the Navajo Nation against the Navajo Nation’s wishes
and do so using a crime that falls outside of the MCA. An affirmative answer
expanded the power the federal government has over the Navajo Nation.
These circumstances are not simply an issue of sovereignty and selfdetermination but also of cultural rights given the Navajo Nation’s beliefs
against the death penalty. Without Navajo Nation participation on the jury
the government and Navajo individuals could not adequately represent their
cultural beliefs or sovereign and self-determination interests. Thus, the
Navajo Nation and its citizens had participation rights in the trial under
international law.
The fact that only one juror was Native American, while the rest were
white,263 is a clear violation of the right to participate in the decision-making
process when considered in the context of the racialized strategies the
prosecution employed.264 Although the makeup of the jury alone does not
invalidate the judgement, one Native American on the jury is not sufficient
to constitute participation by the Navajo Nation or its citizens, particularly
where the prosecution was relying on racial biases to advance its case.265
Moreover, in cases that exclusively implicate intra-Tribal affairs, such as this
one, the Tribal Nation should arguably have input on the jury selection
process.
Additionally, the United States violated the UN Charter, because it not
only failed266 to facilitate the involvement of the Navajo Nation: the
prosecution actively worked against such involvement by striking jurors
based on their Navajo language or beliefs.267 In fact, if the prosecution had
had its way, there would not have been any Native American jurors at all, as
the one Native American juror who remained was prevented from being
261. Role of Languages and Culture, supra note 212, ¶ 10.
262. Id.; ICCPR, supra note 177, arts. 2, 27.
263. See supra Part III.A.
264. See supra Part III.A.
265. See supra Part III.A.
266. As discussed supra, the Declaration on Friendly Relations states that an interference with selfdetermination is a violation of the UN Charter. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part III.A; United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 998 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to
grant a new trial based on the claims of racial discrimination).
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struck through a Batson challenge.268 Further, the Navajo Nation’s attempts
at participation in the process, through letters and other pleas to the court
asserting that the Nation disagreed with the imposition of the death penalty
on its citizens, were disregarded, evidenced most acutely by the
administration of the sentence.269
The prosecution’s exclusion of Native Americans from the jury was
part of a broader racialized prosecutorial strategy. Indeed, violations of
Lezmond Mitchell’s rights to be free from racial discrimination pervaded his
proceedings. While one Native American juror was preserved through the
Batson challenge, the court sustained the striking of the only Black juror who
made it to the peremptory stage, on grounds that Lezmond Mitchell
maintained were clearly erroneous.270 The racial discrimination inherent in
his case pervaded not only the striking of jurors, but also his treatment at
trial. As discussed infra, the prosecution used racially derogatory language
to describe Mitchell, and the case overall,271 including using such violent
language as to invoke the memory of the lynching of Native Americans, as
a means to persuade the jury.272 The court determined that the nature of his
crime was such that this violent language could not have amounted to an
error worthy of reversal.273 But the evidence indicates that the prosecutor
surely believed that the tactic of invoking racial biases would be persuasive
in swaying the jury, especially when considered alongside the attempts to
strike every Native American and Black juror. Indeed, these attempts to
strike Native American and Black jurors suggest that the prosecutor sought

268. See supra Part III.A.
269. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 998 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
270. Id. (“In assessing the prima facie case of discrimination with respect to juror # 30, the trial court
gave no weight to its previous finding that the prosecution violated Batson by striking . . . the only Native
American remaining on the panel. However, . . . the prosecution’s strikes of jurors of one race are relevant
in assessing strikes of jurors of another race. This is particularly true when the absolute number of jurors
of a particular racial group is small, and the use of challenges against that group may be insufficient to
support an inference of discrimination.”).
271. The use of such language violated Lezmond Mitchell’s rights under the ICCPR and CERD. The
use of racially violent and discriminatory language violated his right to be equal before the court. ICCPR,
supra note 177, art.14, ¶ 1; ICERD, supra note 15, art. 5. And it violated the duty of the United States,
under CERD, to prevent its officials from promoting or inciting racial discrimination. ICERD, supra note
15, art. 4. In fact, when this issue was raised before the court, the United States dismissed it as “not
affect[ing] Mitchell’s substantial rights.” Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 996. Additionally, the right to dignity of
the person includes the right to be free of such abuse as the use of racially violent language at one’s trial.
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1599 (2010)
(arguing that freedom from “abuse, defamation, humiliation, discrimination, and violence on grounds of
race” is an aspect of dignity).
272. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 996; see supra Part III.A.
273. Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 996.
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to intentionally excluded Native Americans and other non-white jurors in
order to establish a venire that would be receptive to such racialized
arguments, and thus more likely to side with the prosecution.274
Finally, the cultural rights of the Navajo Nation and its citizens were
violated given the disregard for their cultural beliefs and language.275 By
ignoring the cultural beliefs of the Navajo Nation and its citizens on the death
penalty the United States did not pay due regard to their culture; and it
violated the language requirement by failing to provide language services to
potential Navajo jurors.276

VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has violated the rights of Indigenous Peoples from its
beginning.277 And like the encroachment on Tribal lands, the rights of Tribal
Nations were chipped away. The acts of the United States in the case of
Lezmond Mitchell cannot be supported by international or domestic law.
And beyond only lacking legal support, the exercise of federal jurisdiction
over criminal law on Tribal lands constitutes a violation of the Navajo
Nation’s right to self-determination, and in this case, the violation of
Lezmond Mitchell’s human rights. As Judge Hurwitz stated in his
concurrence:
[w]hen the sovereign nation upon whose territory the crime took place
opposes capital punishment of a tribal member whose victims were also
tribal members because it conflicts with that nation’s ‘culture and
religion,’ a proper respect for tribal sovereignty requires that the federal
government not only pause before seeking that sanction, but pause again
before imposing it.278

He also advised that the Executive Branch reexamine the policy of applying
the death penalty to Tribal citizens.279 And indeed, it is imperative that the
United States reexamines its understanding of federal plenary power, in
274. See supra Part III.A (describing the striking of Navajo jurors based on their “Navajo
language/and beliefs”).
275. See supra Part III.A.
276. See supra Part III.A.
277. See generally Brook Colley, A Nation Founded on Genocide, 32 WOMEN’S REV. BOOKS 19
(2015) (reviewing ROXANNE DUNBAR-ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (2014)).
278. Mitchell v. United States, 958 F.3d 775, 794 (9th Cir. 2020) (Hurwitz, J., concurring).
279. Id.
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order to avoid further violations of self-determination and human rights, as
well as to provide proper remedies for the violations already committed.

